Officials 'Never Thought
of an Airplane Being Used as a Missile' By Jeff Johnson CNSNews.com
Congressional Bureau Chief May 23, 2003Capitol Hill
(CNSNews.com) - Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta told
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(also known as the 9/11 Commission) Friday that, prior to the 9/11
terrorist attacks, aviation security officials had not considered
that a hijacker might commandeer an airplane for any reason other
than taking hostages. "I don't think we ever thought of an
airplane being used as a missile," Mineta declared. But
former Rep. Tim Roemer (D-Ind.), who now serves on the commission,
challenged Mineta's claim. Roemer noted that there was consideration
within intelligence agencies that terrorists might plan an attack
such as the one carried out on 9/11. "Wouldn't you view it as
a failure of our intelligence community not to tell the secretary of
transportation that there was such a conceivable threat, that the
people like the Coast Guard and the FAA should be thinking about?"
Roemer asked. "We had no information of that nature at all,"
Mineta replied. "There was nothing in those intelligence
reports that would have been specific to anything that happened on
the 11th of September," Mineta said. "There was nothing in the
preceding time period about aircraft being used as a weapon or of
any other terrorist types of activities of that nature." But
those statements directly contradict documentation compiled by
aviation security analyst Andrew Thomas in his new book Aviation
Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel . "With all
due respect to Secretary Mineta, either he's incredibly in denial or
just simply not the sharpest tool in the woodshed," Thomas told \b
CNSNews.com Friday. "There were clearly - well before 9/11,
years before 9/11 - numerous instances where we knew of both al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups threatening or actually putting
into place the hijacking of commercial airliners and slamming them
into targets on the ground." Al Qaeda started planning
suicide hijackings years earlier Thomas details a 1995
warning from Philippine authorities to the FBI about a plot by the
mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Ahmed
Yousef, and an accomplice, Abdul Murad. "During intense and
often brutal interrogations by Philippine authorities, Murad told of
detailed plans to simultaneously blow up several planes over the
Pacific Ocean," Thomas wrote, "while he and another suicide hijacker
would each carry out kamikaze suicide attacks on the CIA and the
Pentagon, respectively." Yousef later bragged of the plot to
federal agents transporting him back to the U.S. after his arrest in
Pakistan later in 1995. "Yousef reportedly told FBI agent
Brian Parr and other agents guarding him that he had narrowly missed
several opportunities to blow up a dozen airliners in the Pacific in
one single day," Thomas wrote, "and carry out a suicide attack on
CIA headquarters." Retired FAA agent warned 9/11-type attacks
were possible In a May 7, 2001, letter to Sen. John Kerry
(D-Mass.), retired FAA Special Agent Brian Sullivan wrote that the
FAA needed to change its security focus from hijackings to take
hostages to the possibility of terrorists targeting airliners for
much more sinister purposes. "While the FAA has focused on
screening for handguns, new threats have emerged, such as chemical
and biological weapons," Sullivan wrote. "Do you really think a
screener could detect a bottle of liquid explosive, a small battery
and a detonator in your carry-on baggage? "And with the
concept of jihad ," Sullivan continued in an ominous
foreshadowing, "do you think it would be difficult for a determined
terrorist to get on a plane and destroy himself and all other
passengers? The answers to these questions are obvious." A
second incident detailed by Thomas happened much closer in time to
the 9/11 attacks. "In June of 2001, there was a threat
against the Group of 8 Summit in Genoa, Italy," he recalled. "And
the government took that so seriously that they stationed
anti-aircraft batteries around the city to prevent European
airliners from being hijacked and slammed into the
building." The threat gained credibility after Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak told the French newspaper Le Figaro
that he had viewed a videotape on which Osama bin Laden "spoke of
assassinating President Bush and other heads of state in
Genoa...using an airplane stuffed with explosives." Official
warnings prior to 9/11 not delivered to airlines Thomas
also chronicled a series of intelligence communications in the days,
weeks and months prior to 9/11. "On June 28, 2001, National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice received an intelligence summary
warning that a significant al Qaeda attack in the near future was
'highly likely,'" Thomas wrote. One week later, on July 5,
Thomas claims National Security Council terrorism chief Richard
Clarke convened a White House meeting of the Counter-terrorism
Security Group (CSG). Later that same day, Clarke met with
Rice and President Bush's chief of staff, Andrew Card. A third
meeting that day included the CSG and representatives of the FBI,
FAA and INS. "Clarke told them, 'Something spectacular is
going to happen,'" Thomas wrote. But Thomas's research
indicates that the warnings became even more frequent and specific
as the now-ominous 9/11 date approached:
July 18, 2001: The FAA warned the airlines to "exercise the
highest level of caution;"
July 31, 2001: The FAA advised airlines that terrorists were
"planning and training for hijackings;"
August 17, 2001: The Immigration and Naturalization Service
detained Zacarias Moussaoui, now known as the "20th hijacker" of
the 9/11 attacks, for suspicious activity at a Minnesota flight
school; and
September 4, 2001: The FBI informed the FAA of the
circumstances surrounding Moussaoui's arrest. The FAA did not
alert the airlines. "So the evidence was clear, the
writing was on the wall, the dots were connected and, with all due
respect, again, to Mr. Mineta," Thomas concluded, "he's just being
disingenuous." Mineta maintains, as have other administration
officials, that the government did not have enough information prior
to the 9/11 attacks to have prevented them. Thomas believes
that the problem on Sept. 11, 2001, was not that the aviation
security system failed, but rather that the aviation security system
was - and still is - designed for failure. He recommends focusing on
"bad people rather than bad things" through stricter access control
and limited use of passenger profiling. "The need to look at
certain passengers differently than others from a security
perspective only makes sense," he wrote. "A World War II veteran
simply does not pose the same level of potential threat as a young
man traveling from a troubled country. "To try to argue this
point," Thomas believes, "is silly."E-mail
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